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Most diseases have a patient base lacking in numbers and/or purchasing power for 
blockbuster sales, in turn attracting large-scale commercial R&D (Bartfai and Lees, 2006: 
14, 71). This is especially true for orphan diseases with low patient bases in rich countries 
and neglected diseases (NDs) with low purchasing power in developing countries. In both 
cases, some public intervention is needed to bring about the creation of new drugs.  
The need to design incentives aimed at developing R&D in these two groups of 
diseases is the source of an intense debate in the literature and has generated several 
public interventions such as the initiative of the Center for Global Development (CGD) 
(2005) and public-private partnerships (PPPs). CGD proposes the Advanced Purchase (or 
Market) Commitment (APC) plan for vaccines with heavily subsidized co-payments for 
large quantities of new vaccines with pre-specified characteristics. PPPs are non-for-
profit project-based organizations which reduce the risks and costs of R&D by involving 
governments, private subcontractors like pharmaceutical firms or clinical research 
organizations (CRO) and philanthropic organizations.  
There has been criticism of both the APC (Farlow, 2004; Light, 2005) and PPPs 
(Sarewitz, Foladori et al., 2004: 72-83). But overall PPPs are seen as a better option being 
organizationally flexible and more cost efficient. The majority of recent new drugs for 
NDs have been developed through PPPs, which provide a risk sharing mechanism for 
innovators (Moran, Ropars et al., 2005).  
One objection to the APC raised by both Light (2005) and Farlow (2004) is that 




matters given the role of small firms in developing new drugs. Villa, Compagni et al. 
(2009) demonstrated that the majority of new drugs approved under Orphan drug laws 
targeting diseases with small patient bases have been developed and produced by small 
and medium sized pharmaceutical firms. 35% of all R&D projects on diseases relevant to 
Africa between 1980 and 2004 and the majority of orphan diseases drugs have been 
developed by start-up biotech companies (Pammolli and Riccaboni, 2007:154). Almost 
half of all research projects for NDs under PPPs were conducted by small companies 
(Moran, Ropars, et al., 2005).  
This paper develops a model primarily intended to facilitate R&D of small firms 
by providing cash flow and sharing risks and costs of new drugs development, while 
limiting moral hazards.  
Section 2 describes the model which combines advance market commitment, 
subsidized clinical trials, and rewards based on therapeutical contributions of new drugs 
through a prize screening mechanism. Section 3 formalizes the model following the 
contract theory literature. Section 4 presents the estimations of the expected costs of our 
scheme and it is followed by the conclusion  
 
2. Description of the proposal 
 
Our proposal combines three ideas. The first idea is the proposal of Kremer and 
Glennerster (2004: 104) of bonus payments to drug innovators based on disability-
adjusted life-year (DALY) criteria. Hollis (2006: 130) and Pogge (2006: 146-147) 




second idea is public funding of clinical trials and health value-added pricing (Jayadev 
and Stiglitz, 2009; McGuire, Drummond et al, 2004). The third idea is virtual 
pharmaceutical companies based on outsourcing, which has been a realized business 
model in the industry. According to PAREXEL (2004: 36), the top ten pharmaceutical 
companies as measured by the number of products in development as of March 2004 had 
42.8% of all their drugs in R&D licenced-in. PWC (2009:6) predicts the appearance of a 
new dominant model of pharmaceutical R&D, which consists of a network of 
organisations with a common purpose and a network based company, which will 
outsource most of its activities while managing a research portfolio. 
The aim of the proposed 2-stage public-private partnership Program (2-SPPP) is 
to (i) reward selected innovators for their drug candidates submitted to the Program with 
a fixed prize, (ii) then outsource and pay for clinical trials and evaluation of therapeutic 
quality of the drug candidates to independent professional organizations through 
competitive bids, (iii) assist and pay for drug approvals for successful drug candidates, 
and finally (iv) provide a second prize to innovators based on a formula for the evaluated 
quality of a successful drug in phase III of clinical trials.  
The implementation of our proposal requires the following steps: 
1. In order to launch and supervise the 2-SPPP a board of directors is formed from 
representatives of sponsors and recipient developing countries affected by NDs. A 
reputable international development organization with a UN mandate such as the World 
Bank can provide special preferential loans to developing countries to finance this 
Program. The reputation of the World Bank could have the advantage of reassuring 




2. The board of directors select through a competitive tender an operating non-
profit virtual pharmaceutical company (NVC) with experience in management of 
pharmaceutical R&D and work in developing countries. The NVC must publish clear 
criteria for the selection of a drug candidate into the Program, publicly explain their drug 
selection and financing decisions, promptly publish clinical trials’ results, monitor 
subcontracts based on competitive bids, and channel two payoffs to the winning firms.  
3. The NVC must periodically call for submission of drug candidates from all 
innovators having demonstrated a proof-of-concept or received investigational new drug 
(IND) status from recognized pharmaceutical regulation authorities. Such submission 
should include a drug candidate’s results of preclinical pharmacology and toxicology 
tests; an estimation of expected costs of industrial production of the proposed drug for a 
specified scale; a specification for administration, stability, and storage conditions of a 
the drug; a commitment to issue a licence to conduct trials and put the production and 
distribution licence in the developing countries of the drug in public domain; an outline 
of the clinical development strategy; a consent that all results of clinical trials will be 
promptly published.  
4. The NVC must choose an independent evaluator to conduct cost-efficiency 
analysis of new successful drugs based on phase III clinical trials if a drug candidate 
reaches this phase. McGuire (2001) concludes that cost-efficiency analysis is a consistent 
tool in comparing alternative health products and it might work as a proxy for welfare 
maximization, especially when patients do not bear full costs of their health care or 




benefit or cost-efficiency analysis for national drug reimbursement policies and he 
concludes that such a decision process is workable.  
The evaluator must come to a consensus methodology for cost-benefit analysis to 
be approved and published by the board of directors. Based on the results of the clinical 
trials, the evaluator will give an estimation for the expected ratio of QALYs (DALYs) 
saved by a new drug per $1 of expected drug manufacturing costs, which is referred 
further as drug quality. For each disease, a benchmark drug or treatment and its quality 
must be estimated and announced before the selection of drug candidates into the 
Program.  
5. The NVC recruits part-time pharmaceutical consultants to evaluate/review drug 
candidates and to advise on clinical trials and the drug approval process. All bids, 
submissions, transactions, and decisions of the NVC are promptly published on the 
Program website to encourage public monitoring and health forums facilitated by the 
Program.  
6. The NVC together with the consultants select a pre-specified number of n drug 
candidates. The selection should be based on a predetermined weighted average “promise 
index” of the expected candidate’s manufacturing cost, performance indicators in the pre-
clinical phase, projected storage conditions, and ease of administration. The promise 
index is worked out by consensus among the consultants. The drug candidates with the 
highest promise index are selected for further fully subsidized proof-of-concept (POC) 
studies. Selected on POC results by the NVC, drug candidates progress into clinical trials 




the cost of such studies can range from $6 to $22 million and they emphasize the crucial 
role of drug portfolio selection and POC studies to increase research productivity.  
7. Selected inventors are paid a fixed amount, the first pre-announced fixed prize 
(F), in exchange for a licence for clinical trials, production, and distribution of the drug in 
developing countries. This prize intends to stimulate pre-clinical research by liquidity 
constrained inventors. However, the amount of the first stage prize F is set at a lebel 
below the expected costs of the drug candidate discovery to discourage entrance of 
applicants with low quality candidates.  
8. The NVC contracts out clinical research organizations (CRO) through 
competitive bids to conduct trials with the selected candidates. The establishment in 2003 
of the European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership for building 
capacity for the clinical trial (Kaplan and Laing 2004:102) is already a step in that 
direction. The number of candidates n is determined in the light of budget constraints and 
expected attrition rates. CROs must submit monthly reports of clinical trials to be posted 
on the program’s web site. The NVC has the right to stop and alter clinical trials of a drug 
candidate in case of a drug’s non-performance or safety concerns. A new drug candidate 
is tested against a pre-announced typical drug or a therapy. Sculpher, Claxton et al. 
(2006) conclude that randomised controlled trials are the key for cost-effectiveness 
analysis and that patient population, period, research design and proper comparators must 
be specified for such analysis.   
9. A successful drug candidate after clinical trials is further facilitated with 
registration and then is awarded the second prize (S) in an amount proportional to its 




on the side of inventors, drugs of a quality lower than the benchmark drug for a disease 
are not eligible for the second prize.  The NVC is paid bonuses per number of processed 
drug candidates to enhance management incentives to drop non-performing candidates.  
 
3. Model formalization 
 
The formalization of the model follows the contract theory literature (Salanie, 2005) with 
a prize screening through rewards. The Principal, e.g. the board of the Program directors 
together with the NVC, maximizes the number of quality drugs given the budget by 
setting three major controls: the amount of the first prize F, the second prize S and the 
number of drug candidates n. The Principal sets the prizes to discriminate against low 
quality drugs by fixing incentive compatibility constraints for innovators while 
encouraging their participation in the Program. The drug innovator (the agent) maximizes 
discounted net payoff from the two prizes.   
Drug quality is not perfectly observable and is uncertain even for innovators so 
that a non-price mechanism such as experts’ opinions is needed to admit a candidate into 
clinical trials. However, the proposed incentives should encourage the submission of only 
the most promising drugs, which is also conducive to the reduction of the costs of clinical 
trials. There is a trade-off between setting the first prize high enough to provide cash flow 
for innovators and reducing incentives for submission of low quality candidates. The 
latter must be a priority for the sake of the social surplus.  
The model assumes a fixed number of T years required for a drug development, 




drug quality θ. Suppose benevolent sponsors have a current budget B to maximize 
QALYs saved from a particular disease. Sponsors can purchase B/p treatments of a drug 
priced at p per treatment. If one treatment saves D QALYs, sponsors can save D/pB = θ0B 
QALYs, where θ0 = D/p is the quality of the benchmarking drug defined as number of 
QALYs saved per unit price of the drug. Let sponsors invest C+R into R&D of a new 
drug of quality θ > θ0 with probability of success q in T years, where C is the cost of 
clinical trials plus registration. This is a reasonable decision for risk neutral sponsors if 
discounted with some rate d the number of QALYs saved from the purchase and 
distribution of the new drug and some purchase in the amount of A of the current drug are 
greater than QALYs saved from purchase of the current drug: 
 θ0B ≥ Aθ0 +q(B-A-C-R)θe
(r-d)T → θ>θ0(B-A)e
(d-r)T/(q(B-A-C-R))      (1) 
where r is the discount rate of capital for sponsors, which increases the available budget 
of the sponsors to purchase the new drug in T-th year at e
rT. The amount of A spent on 
purchasing of the current medicine is determined by sponsors’ utility of QALYs.  
Inequality (1) shows that developing a new drug make sense for sponsors if its 
quality is significantly higher than the quality of the existing drug as right hand side 
multipliers are all greater than one:  (B-A)/(B-A-C-R)>1, 1/q>1, and d>r assuming that 
sponsors’ discount rate for QALYs is greater than discount rate for their capital. 
Inequality (1) can be used to set a threshold (benchmark) drug quality for a public drug 
R&D Program: θ ≥ lθ0, where l = (B-A)e
(d-r)T/(q(B-A-C-R)). A rough estimation of this 
threshold is about l=5 assuming 3% discount rate on DALYs used by WHO (2008) in 




development loans, T=10 years, C+R<<B-A, and, according to DiMasi et al (2004), the 
average probability of success in clinical trials is q=0.23.  This means sponsors might 
find it irrational to invest in its R&D unless a new drug’s quality θ is less than 5 times 
better than that of the existing drug quality θ0. 
Consider a simplified problem of risk neutral donors maximizing the QALYs 
saved from a possible new drug development and a current drug for the total drug 
purchase in amount of A in the proposed 2-stage Program: 
max    (θAme
(r-d)T –F – S(θ)– C(θ)–A)q +(1-q)(θ0Ame
(r-d)T –F – S(θ)– C(θ)–A) 
F,S(θ) 
subject to  
firms’ participation constraint:   F + S(θ) – R(θ)≥ V>0 
incentive compatibility constraint 1:  F + S(θ0) – R(θ0)≤ 0 
incentive compatibility constraint 2:  F + S(θ) – R(θ)≥ F + S(θ0) – R(θ0), θ ≥θ0 
where F, S(θ) – the first and the second prizes, V – expected profit of the representative 
firm outside of the Program, i.e. from commercial drug development; m – social value of 
one QALY. The participation constraint states that the representative firm must obtain at 
least the same profit from participation in the Program than from an outside option. The 
first incentive compatibility constraint states that the firm’s payoff from a low quality 
drug, which is here assumed at the level of the benchmarking drug θ0, must not be a 
positive one to prevent entry of firms with what they already know to be a low drug 
quality candidate θ≤θ0. The second constraint requires that the payoff for a better quality 
drug must be greater than the payoff for a drug candidate comparable to the benchmark 
level.  




λ1 – λ2 -1 = 0,  
λ1≥0, λ2≥0, λ3≥0, 
F + S(θ) – R(θ) –  V≥ 0, λ1(F + S(θ) – R(θ) – V)=0 
R(θ0) – F – S(θ0) ≥0, λ2(R(θ0) – F – S(θ0))=0 
S(θ) – S(θ0) + R(θ0) – R(θ)≥ 0, λ3(S(θ) – S(θ0) + R(θ0) – R(θ))=0 
qAme
(r-d)T+ (λ1+ λ3 – 1) S’(θ) - R’(θ)(λ1+ λ3) – C’(θ)=0 
where λ1, λ2, and λ3 are Lagrange multipliers for the participation, the incentive 
compatibility 1, and the incentive compatibility 2 constraints respectively. 
The constraint 2 is not binding as its right hand side is not positive, whereas its 
left hand side is positive according to the participation constraint; hence λ3=0. The 
participation constraint must be binding: otherwise it would be possible to increase the 
first and the second payment by an infinitesimal amount without violation of the 
constraint. Such an increase in the payments would diminish the objective function; 
hence, the objective function is not maximized when the constraint is not binding. 
Similarly one must conclude that the incentive compatibility constraint 1 must be 
binding: F + S(θ) – R(θ)= V and the incentive compatibility constraint is   
F + S(θ0) – R(θ0)= 0 → F =R(θ0) – S(θ0). Normalizing the second payment for drug 
quality θ≤θ0 at zero to discourage entry of low quality candidates: S(θ0)=0 →F =R(θ0). 
Hence, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are simplified with λ3=0, λ1>0, λ2>0 to  
Ame
(r-d)T=R’(θ) + C’(θ)  
Simplifying to C’(θ) =0, i.e. assuming that the costs of clinical trials are 
independent of drug quality, and taking into account differentiation of the participation 




S’(θ)= R’(θ), then S’(θ)= Ave
(r-d)T=k – a parameter. The solution to this equation is  
S = kθ +k0. Given that S(θ0)=0= kθ0 +k0 →k0 = – kθ0→ S=k(θ – θ0), i.e. the second 
optimal payoff must be set in proportion to the marginal drug quality (θ – θ0). In this case 
marginal incentives for drug quality are constant and equal k and independent of 
probability of success q. We hypothesize that this linear incentive provided by the second 
prize can still be robust even in the case of risk-averse firms (see the discussion of 
advantages of linear contracts by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)).   
Consider now the risk-neutral innovator problem of maximization of the net 
payoffs from the Program by quality θ: 
max  q(Fe
-rt(θ) + k(θ – θ0)e
-rT – R(θ)) + (1-q)(Fe
-rt(θ) – R(θ)) 
θ 
 




assuming t’(θ)>0 as time of research and pre-clinical R&D costs R’(θ)>0 are 
proportionate to drug quality and R’(θ) = b is a small number in comparison to  
Frt’(θ)e
-rt(θ), the first order condition can be expressed as 
t’(θ)=qke
-r(T-t(θ))/(Fr) this implies that under the Program the firm chooses drug quality θ 
and related R&D time in proportion to qke
-r(T)/(Fr). Therefore, the managing company 
can increase k to enable targeting of higher drug quality by the firm as payoff increases in 
θ. The coefficient k must be set in consultations with the industry and sponsors. The NVC 
can also increase the probability of success q by exercising care in the choice of a 
portfolio of drug candidates. Assuming that the social value m of one QALY is 




around $1000, then the parameter k can be set as k=Ave
(r-d)T ~ 1220A assuming r=3%, 
d=1%, T=10 years. 
 
4. Calibration of the model 
 
The outside option for a small firm can be approximated by participation in the orphan 
drug development scheme, which might provide the net present value of a stream of 
profits from annual $500 million sales of an orphan drug for 15 years of effective patent 
life and exclusive marketing rights applying an annual discount rate of 15%. Our discount 
rate of 15% follows from the estimations of Taylor (1999: 144) for the internal rates of 
return that ranged from 11.37 to 22.46% for a dozen of top American pharmaceutical 
companies between 1975 and 1991. Vogel (2007: 74) noticed that top pharmaceutical 
companies enjoy 23.6% net profit before taxes so that we assume that 20% of those a half 
of billion sales are translated into net profit, which is  V ≈ $585 million in net present 
value. 
Kaplan and Laing (2004: 101) summarized five sources of estimations and 
concluded that direct preclinical development costs ranged from $8.33 to $26.0 million. 
Preclinical tests of drug candidates for tropical infectious diseases can serve as a good 
proxy for success in clinical trials while preclinical trials costs are estimated at $20 
million (Hopkins, Witty et al. 2007).  
Let us consider the major ND – tuberculosis. According to the report of the 
Global Alliance for TB Drug Development (2001: 40,47,52-57) the out-of-pocket costs of 




preclinical safety studies can be accomplished in 82 weeks. The out-of-pocket costs of all 
clinical trials for a new anti-TB agent in developing countries such as India and South 
Africa would be about $9.9 million and would last 7-10 years. In a developed country, 
costs of phase I anti-TB drug trials were about $0.65 million, phase II – $3.4 million, 
phase III – $22.6 million, but for Uganda, similar costs are much lower: phase I - $0.16 
million, phase II – $1.6 million, phase III – $8.2 million. Based on this data, in the case of 
tuberculosis in year 2000 prices, the first payment can be set at F=$5 m, the second 
payment to be set at about S~V-F =$585 m - $5 m = $580 m for a good drug, though the 
second payment is set in proportion to the desired drug quality by adjusting the parameter 
k.  
Estimated probabilities for an anti-infective drug candidate is 0.661 for entering 
the phase II of trials and 0.382 for phase III (DiMasi et al, 2004). This implies out-of-
pocket expected costs of a TB drug candidate clinical trials in Uganda at $0.16 m + 
0.661*$1.6m + 0.382*$8.2 m ~ $4.5 m. Thus, expected Program costs would be ($4.5 m 
+$585 + $10 m) *1.2 = $719.4 m. The coefficient 1.2 includes 20% overhead costs, 
which are estimated at 20-30% for a commercial research projects (Paul, et al, 2010) to 
run the Program administration.   
A firm might find it quite attractive to invest in pre-clinical studies that take 
approximately three years (PAREXEL, 2004: 183) in a prospect of obtaining $5 m cash 
flow and another $580 m at the end of the following seven years if the drug against 
tuberculosis is developed. If such a drug is not developed, the Program pays only the first 
payment ($5 m), POC costs (P) are assumed at $2 m, and clinical trials costs (about $10 




the very promising drug candidate failure at the end of phase III trials. The Program 
shares risks, which ought to be paid. 
The Program can choose a complementary portfolio of drug candidates to increase 
the rate of success. Let us consider a simple case of n independent candidates with 
individual success rate q, which is the Bernoulli distribution with an expected number of 
successful drugs nq and variance nq(1-q). If the Program wants to reduce its overall 
failure rate with such n drug candidates to less than α; the probability of failure for n 
independent trials would be (1-q)
n ≤ 0.05 → n≥log(α)/log(1-q). Given a standard α=0.05, 
i.e. achieving the Program’s success with a 95% confidence, q can be estimated by 
assuming  that one in five of compounds entering clinical trials will be successful. Table 
1 shows the expected costs of the Program.  
 





































drug (if more 
than 95% 
failure rate),  
[n(F+C+P)+ 
S]*1.2 
0.1  29  2.9  2610.0  900.0  1287.6 
0.15  19  2.85  2371.2  832.0  1083.6 
0.2  14  2.8  2234.4  798.0  981.6 
0.25  11  2.75  2138.4  777.6  920.4 
0.3  9  2.7  2062.8  764.0  879.6 
0.35  7  2.45  1848.0  754.3  838.8 
0.4  6  2.4  1792.8  747.0  818.4 
Note: assuming Bernoulli distribution, the second payment S=$580mln, the first payment F= $5 m,  
costs of clinical trials C = $10 m and 20% overhead costs.  
 
Paul, et al (2010: 205) offer an alternative estimation showing that 9 to 11 drug 




of successful passing of clinical trials is about 0.12. However, this probability could be 
too low as a significant share of candidates are dropped due to financial and strategic 
considerations in commercial R&D (DiMasi, et al, 2004). 
The assumed range of probabilities for success in clinical trials (Table 1) 
corresponds with the rates from 12% to 33.3% for self-originated new chemical entities 
(DiMasi, 2001:301) for the therapeutic classes of neglected diseases. However, the 
benchmarking average success rate of 20% is lower than the average success rate for anti-
infective drug candidates, which are estimated at 28% by DiMasi.   
In general, in 2000 prices for the tuberculosis 2-SPPP is expected to run at an 
average cost of $800 m and delivering two or three new quality drugs. The proposed 
Program should deliver at least one new quality drug at a cost of $982 m assuming a 20% 




The proposed scheme focuses on cost-efficient drug discovery only. The estimated costs of 
the Program for a TB drug are approximately $750-900 m per successful drug in year 2000 
prices. These costs of the proposed Program are higher than those of PPPs due to setting 
relatively high outside commercial option for firms, but essentially lower than the ones 
estimated for the APC scheme. Given that the proposed Program targets high quality drugs 
and allocates production licences of new drugs in developing countries into the public 
domain, this scheme can compete with PPPs, which are considered to be the current best 




revealed drug quality; prompt publication of the information about performance of all drug 
candidates, a large reduction of risks and costs for small innovators; and better 
incorporation of developing country needs.  
Potential problems of the proposal include an incentive for firms with sunk R&D 
costs to overstate the attributes of their drug candidate. The Program management should 
balance this by a right to contract out some independent tests on key characteristics of a 
candidate. There could be practical difficulties with accurate cost-benefit analysis of new 
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